Category Archives: Oil

Friedman: Turkey Attractive, Skeptical On India

Friedman: Turkey Attractive, Skeptical On India
George Friedman is one of the leading geopolitical strategists of our time. He founded Strategic Forecasting Inc. (Stratfor), an intelligence and consulting firm, in 1996, and serves as the company’s CEO and chief intelligence officer. Dr. Friedman is highly sought out by various organizations from around the globe for his geopolitical analysis and advice. He is the author of “The Next 100 Years” and “The Next Decade,” both New York Times best-sellers.Dr. Friedman recently sat down with to discuss the ongoing tensions in Asia between China, Japan and Vietnam, and highlights which Southeast Asian nations are poised for a growth spurt. He also spells out what a Modi-led election win in India means for its market, how fracking will impact geopolitics in the future, and tells us which country he favors the most economically in the coming decade. Last quarter, you said the markets were overreacting to the situation in Ukraine. Has anything surprised you regarding the renewed tensions between the West and Russia since?
George Friedman: Nothing like the Cold War where there were really massive tensions. And the markets weren’t necessarily affected by much of what went on in the Cold War. We had massive rallies. We had busts. We had the entire range of things.So from the standpoint of the international system, what’s happening in Ukraine is causing a realignment of the West. It’s very complicated. The Russians are still being extremely cautious. But its impact on the markets is dubious; it’s just not that significant on that level. Do you also hold that view with Eastern European peripheral nations?
Friedman: That has a different dimension. When you take a look at these countries—Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, but particularly Poland and Romania, which has taken a leading position with the Americans—this is simply another fracture point in the European Union.We already have the fracture point in the European Union between southern Europe and northern Europe. We have a fracture point developing between France and Germany. We have fracture points developing politically, as we saw with the right wing success during the European parliamentary elections.Now we have another one, which is where Poland and Romania and these other countries have a vested interest in what happens in Ukraine. Portugal and Italy and even Germany have much lower stakes, where the effect is not where you might expect it. It is in another dimension of disunification of Europe, and a much stronger presence of the United States in western and central Europe in its alignment with the Poles and Romanians.

So when everything was done here—and these countries in the eastern frontier certainly had concerns about what Russia was going to do—it wasn’t the European Union, it wasn’t the European countries that took a leading position, it was President Obama going to Poland, Vice President Biden going to Romania, endless diplomacy going back and forth that was key. Last quarter, you referred to the friction between Japan and China as saber rattling. China is now having territorial disputes with Vietnam, causing a plunge in Vietnamese equities. There’s a sense of increased nationalism throughout Asia. Do you see confrontations in Asia escalating? How will that impact economic growth in the region?
Friedman: Divide them between two parts, between those where the confrontation has to be naval, such as between Japan and China. Those are less likely to happen simply because of the limits on the navies in the region. It takes a lot to have a naval confrontation.

Vietnam is a special case because it borders China. Although China went to war with Vietnam in the 1970s, and was pretty badly defeated by the Vietnamese, there’s always the possibility of it escalating to a conflict.

In this particular case, the Chinese are really not itching to have another go at the Vietnamese. They badly miscalculated last time, and in many ways, the Vietnamese are as strong as they were then. The Vietnamese are certainly not looking for a battle with the Chinese.

So my argument is that the Vietnamese/Chinese relationship is qualitatively different from the Chinese/Japanese relationship at this point in time, because one is a ground conflict between two countries and borders, and the other is a naval conflict that neither is in a position to engage in. Are you optimistic about Vietnam’s economic growth prospects?

Friedman: Vietnam has had a growth spurt. If it’s unlucky, it’ll grow like China and wind up in an impossible situation. If it’s lucky, it’ll slow down, consolidate, have a business cycle, cull the inefficient businesses and move forward. So my view of potential growth is that it’s probably the worst thing a country can have, because eventually, as with Japan in 1991, that ends, and ends badly.

So my argument is that Vietnam should have a cyclical downturn; it’s probably having one. But there are other countries emerging in Southeast Asia—including Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, the eastern parts of southeast Asia, the Philippines—that are also due, at least some of them, to have a growth spurt.

Ecologically, there are only so many low-wage, high-growth countries that can fit into the box. Vietnam may not have made as much of its growth spurt as it could have—I rather think it has—but it could also wind up in a much more crowded atmosphere. Of those Southeast Asian countries, Laos and Cambodia still only have a handful of securities listed on their exchanges. Myanmar is currently working on creating a stock exchange. Are there any investable markets in Southeast Asia in which you share that same optimism?

Friedman: First of all, all these markets are sketchy in some ways, including the Chinese, I might add. These are debt-driven, not equity-driven economies. That is, if you want to start a business, you don’t normally go do an IPO; you normally go to a bank and do a financing and the bank president sits on your board, and so on.

Looking at these countries’ level of economic development in terms of the viability of the equities market is kind of a mismatch. Their equity market grows far later than their economies do.

So what you do here is, when you make investments, you can’t treat it as a Western equity-driven country. You go in—as many have done very successfully—and you actually invest in various projects and companies. It’s a direct investment play at this point. Most Western investors aren’t comfortable doing that, so they miss on the first major growth spurt—except for those who do make this investment; they come out quite happy to have participated.

So in these countries in Asia, given their structure, the very fact that they’re beginning to grow but there’s no equity market is the opportunity. But it’s a harder opportunity to take. What do you make of Abe and his political agenda? Will his attempts to rewrite Article 9 of the Constitution and rebuild Japan’s military, hinder alliances in the region, possibly affecting the country’s growth?

Friedman: Japan is the third-largest economy in Asia, if you buy the Chinese numbers. It is also a country, unlike China, without a billion impoverished people. It’s highly unified. It has disregarded Article 9 of the Constitution for decades, having a military of substantial size, having a naval force and an air force, designating it all as a Self Defense Force and twisting it.

So Japan is already a major power, and I would argue that in East Asia, it is a far more significant major power than China, because the Chinese military, the armed ground forces—the People’s Revolutionary Army—is primarily a domestic security force, not a conventional army. Its naval power is emerging, but has not yet reached a point where it could challenge the United States, and I think would have a great deal of trouble challenging the Japanese.

Abe is not an ultranationalist, he’s a nationalist. He is coming out, as was inevitable, as unabashedly acting in the interests of Japan. Now, the Japanese always acted in the interests of Japan; they just had a little pretense that they had no national interests. But they did; everybody in Asia knew they did, and they worked in tandem with the United States.

The important question is not whether Japan is a great power; it is. Or whether it has national interests; it does. It’s about what its relationship to the United States is. Japan has chosen to shape its strategic outlook for close to 70 years based on alignment with the United States. The question to ask about Abe is, Is he prepared to simply continue this alignment, or is Japan going to go out on its own?

I think the answer is that he’s certainly not going to dramatically shift that alignment, but he is going to make clear his alignment between two equal nations—at least in principle—and that on occasion, it will pursue its own interests independent of the United States. So it’s simply an obvious thing happening. What else would the third-largest power country in the world do but act like the third-largest country? Moving on to India, Indian equities have been surging for the past six months in anticipation of a BJP/Modi win. Now that he’s prime minister, have the markets gotten ahead of themselves with regard to what Modi can accomplish at the national level?

Friedman: Oh, way ahead of themselves. The markets excited themselves over Modi without realizing that in the end, as prime minister, there are limits to what he can do. First, the national government is surrounded by these states that have tremendous influence on what can be done. Second, the Indian bureaucracy is enormously inefficient, and simply shouting orders at a ship that doesn’t hear you doesn’t do much.

He said all the things that the markets wanted to hear. Markets have a strange belief that the nature of the leader can magically transform a country. There are institutional realities in India that cannot easily be overcome. Now that he’s in office, disappointment will come in very quickly. Fracking and new extraction methods have unexpectedly tilted the world’s energy riches toward the U/S/ and away from the Middle East. How will this shift affect geopolitics in the coming years, and what is your view on the price of oil in the coming years?

Friedman: It’s changed the geometry of supply and demand dramatically. At the time that Europe and China are slowing and new powers have not emerged, the United States has come on the market with a source of energy nobody calculated. As that technology spreads to other countries, you will also see even more energy being produced.

There are legal limitations in some places, environmental limitations. But in the end, this technology is going to change things. It is very difficult for me to see how the price of oil is maintained at current levels. But it’s hard for me to see why they’re contained there at current levels in the first place. That shows the limits of my knowledge; I don’t pretend to be an oil trader.

But it seems to me that the pressures—particularly if the United States starts to legalize exports, which I suspect it will—that these structural shifts are going to create a very different dynamic for 20 or 30 years in energy. Looking out into the coming decade, what region or country are you most optimistic about economically?

Friedman: The United States. The United States, unlike Europe, is not fragmented into tiny pieces. Unlike China, it isn’t suffering with a billion impoverished people. I see some lesser countries emerging—Poland, Turkey. I see Japan, which has done remarkably well over the past 20 years in maintaining its status as a major economic power, all of which are attractive.

But far and away, the most attractive remains the United States. It has a low population density. It has a great deal of land available. It has all the things that you’d want to see geopolitically in a country rising. How does Turkey look at the moment? Is it out of the woods politically, and can it now move ahead with reforms?

Friedman: They don’t have to move onto reforms; they’ve done extremely well in the past 10 years without those reforms. They had some riots. Other countries have riots; the United States had riots in the 1960s and ’70s. There’s a tendency to see every large-scale demonstration in the country as being a major upheaval. What’s interesting is how meekly they contained it and moved on. So having just been in Turkey, this country has maintained an extraordinary growth rate, aside from 2009. It’s not an accident. Thanks for your time. INSIGHTS
Vanguard Total Stock Market (VTI | A-100)
Looking out over the coming decade, Friedman still finds the U.S. more attractive—economically and geopolitically—than any other country on the planet. While he gives no opinion on current U.S. stock valuations, for a cheap and efficient long-term bet on the U.S. economy, it doesn’t get any better than VTI. Holding more than 3,500 companies of all sizes, the cap-weighted VTI delivers total market coverage of U.S. equities at a shockingly low 0.05% cost. Even better, the fund has phenomenal tracking history, with little to no slippage from its index, making it practically free to hold the fund. Trading more than $170 million at pennywide spreads daily, VTI is the poster child for what makes ETFs such an efficient, long-term investment vehicle.
iShares MSCI Turkey (TUR | B-99)
Friedman sees Turkey as a country well positioned for growth. For the past decade, it has been growing at a phenomenal rate—the country went from a 2002 GDP of $196 billion to a 2013 GDP of $789 billion. In regard to Turkey’s tremendous growth, Friedman notes, “It’s not an accident”—suggesting that the country has a political and economic foundation built for growth. To access this growth theme, consider TUR, which tracks a market-cap-weighted index of more than 80 Turkish companies. If Friedman proves correct about the country’s growth prospects, its equities are selling at a discount—TUR’s 11.09 P/E is a fraction of the richer valuations seen in some emerging markets. Alpha Think Tank ETF Tracker
Methodology: ETF selections are made solely by They are neither selected by, nor are they investment recommendations from, Alpha Think Tank strategists. ETF selections are made by the Analytics team based on the themes highlighted in each weekly interview with Alpha Think Tank strategists.We implement a stop-loss of 10% from the Pick Date, whereby any funds triggered by that stop will drop off the tracker. The tracker data is updated weekly and is subject to change, according to our ongoing interviews with our strategists.
Ticker Fund Name
Pick Date
TR %
(Since Pick Date)
TR %
(1 Yr)
Closing Price $ (6/12/14) Inspired By
INDA iShares MSCI India 2/24/14 25.11 29.11 30.24 Roubini
EWI iShares MSCI Italy Capped 1/27/14 15.28 44.01 17.96 Luskin
EWP iShares MSCI Spain Capped 1/27/14 15.22 49.81 43.46 Luskin
EWW iShares MSCI Mexico Capped 3/3/14 13.76 7.68 67.69 Friedman
CCXE WisdomTree Commodity Country Equity 3/14/14 12.94 17.22 32.49 Schiff
PXH PowerShares FTSE RAFI Emerging Markets 2/17/14 12.33 12.95 21.56 Arnott
AMU ETRACS Alerian MLP ETN 1/27/14 12.05 18.93 31.52 Luskin
INDA iShares MSCI India 4/9/14 11.67 29.11 30.24 Kotok
EWP iShares MSCI Spain Capped 2/24/14 9.11 49.81 43.46 Roubini
EWY iShares MSCI South Korea Capped 2/24/14 7.92 20.59 65 Roubini
GXC SPDR S&P China 2/3/14 7.91 14.61 75.03 Rogers
RSX Market Vectors Russia 2/3/14 7.70 10.15 26.29 Rogers
EWW iShares MSCI Mexico Capped 2/11/14 7.16 7.68 67.69 Fitzsimmons
EWP iShares MSCI Spain Capped 3/10/14 7.12 49.81 43.46 Dorsey
ELD WisdomTree Emerging Markets Local Debt 2/17/14 6.15 0.47 47.26 Arnott
EPOL iShares MSCI Poland Capped 3/3/14 5.86 14.90 30.52 Friedman
IEMG iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets 4/28/14 5.62 13.27 52.1 Luskin
GULF WisdomTree Middle East Dividend 3/10/14 5.61 31.26 23.07 Dorsey
VCLT Vanguard Long-Term Corporate Bond 3/17/14 5.25 8.90 89.28 Yardeni
NKY Maxis Nikkei 225 2/3/14 4.95 9.15 17.39 Rogers
FXA CurrencyShares Australian Dollar 3/14/14 4.83 1.35 94.27 Schiff
MCHI iShares MSCI China 4/15/14 4.58 12.03 46.79 Faber
GMF SPDR S&P Emerging Asia Pacific 4/9/14 4.19 14.94 82.455 Kotok
EWJ iShares MSCI Japan 3/3/14 3.79 8.74 11.77 Friedman
VTI Vanguard Total Stock Market 4/28/14 3.72 22.74 100.29 Luskin
RSP Guggenheim S&P 500 Equal Weight 3/10/14 3.10 24.65 75.36 Dorsey
BKF iShares MSCI BRIC 5/22/14 2.76 12.93 39.09 Arnott
BAB PowerShares Build America Bond 4/9/14 2.63 7.24 29.3 Kotok
FXC CurrencyShares Canadian Dollar Trust 3/14/14 2.28 -5.69 91.6 Schiff
ERUS iShares MSCI Russia Capped 5/22/14 2.23 7.15 20.16 Arnott
GDX Market Vectors Gold Miners 3/31/14 1.80 -14.44 24.03 Merk
DBGR db X-trackers MSCI Germany Hedged Equity 2/24/14 1.70 21.72 26.58 Roubini
EWS iShares MSCI Singapore 5/5/14 1.47 10.32 13.81 Bremmer
FXY CurrencyShares Japanese Yen Trust 3/31/14 1.46 -5.94 95.91 Merk
DBC PowerShares DB Commodity Tracking 3/14/14 1.38 1.42 26.39 Schiff
EWH iShares MSCI Hong Kong 4/15/14 1.34 15.94 21.1 Faber
DBC PowerShares DB Commodity Tracking 3/31/14 1.03 1.42 26.39 Merk
DBB PowerShares DB Base Metals 5/8/14 1.01 -4.57 16.08 Gartman
XLU Utilities Select SPDR 4/9/14 0.93 17.68 42.28 Kotok
SCPB SPDR Barclays Short Term Corporate Bond 3/17/14 0.41 1.57 30.79 Yardeni
ITA iShares U.S. Aerospace & Defense 5/5/14 0.34 39.41 110.72 Bremmer
KOL Market Vectors Coal 5/8/14 -0.11 -0.86 18.5 Gartman
USDU WisdomTree Bloomberg US Dollar Bullish 4/15/14 -0.12 N/A 24.771 Faber
VNM Market Vectors Vietnam 4/15/14 -0.17 5.58 20.7 Faber
ROBO Robo-Stox Global Robotics and Automation 3/3/14 -0.18 N/A 26.91 Friedman
AFK Market Vectors Africa 5/5/14 -0.79 18.15 32.86 Bremmer
CHIQ Global X China Consumer 3/17/14 -1.40 2.41 14.04 Yardeni
FXE CurrencyShares Euro 3/31/14 -1.58 1.37 133.88 Merk
XRT SPDR S&P Retail 3/17/14 -1.99 10.71 84.41 Yardeni
EIDO iShares MSCI Indonesia 5/28/14 -3.82 -8.51 27.22 Fitzsimmons
CHIQ Global X China Consumer 2/11/14 -5.20 2.41 14.04 Fitzsimmons
PEJ PowerShares Dynamic Leisure and Entertainment 3/17/14 -5.98 19.66 33.19 Yardeni
IAU iShares Gold Trust 3/14/14 -7.84 -8.45 12.35 Schiff
Data as of 6/12/14

Sustainability as an Investment Class


WEF Impact Investing Report

wef-impact-investing-thumbOver the last few years, much excitement has been generated around the term “impact investing” – an investment approach that intentionally seeks to create both financial return and measurable positive social or environmental impact. Despite the buzz, there is limited consensus among mainstream investors and specialized niche players on what impact investing is, what asset classes are most relevant, how the ecosystem is structured and what constraints the sector faces. As a result, there is widespread confusion regarding what impact investing promises and ultimately delivers.

This report is a result of engaging over 150 mainstream investors, business executives, philanthropic leaders and policy-makers through interviews, workshops and conference calls. The overall objective of the Mainstreaming Impact Investing initiative is to provide an initial assessment of the sector and identify the factors constraining the acceleration of capital into the field of impact investing.

Download the report (PDF)


Commodities and geopolitics: regarding the likelihood and risks of escalation of military conflicts

Commodity prices have always been sensitive to geopolitics, but this has particularly been true over the last few weeks and months as the Western powers very nearly got involved in yet another costly military conflict in the Middle East. They may yet do so in the near future, sending the prices of oil and precious metals considerably higher. Today’s post examines the economic phenomenon of deflationary gap which is at the heart of the growing militarism of the western powers and their increasing propensity to resort to war as the key foreign policy tool.

Over the past few weeks we’ve witnessed a disconcerting spectacle of geopolitical maneuvering around the ongoing Syrian conflict. The escalation of military confrontation could have grave and unpredictable consequences. One of the more perplexing aspects of this crisis is the keen appetite for war displayed by the western leaders, particularly those of the US, UK and France. Regardless of the merits of their case, most of us who have grown up in the west were raised to believe in certain values where the political leaders are meant to respect the will of their constituents, where law – including the international law – is upheld whether this is convenient or not, and where war is always the solution of last resort, engaged only in the event of national defense or in response to a clear and present threat. Now, for some reason this has all been turned upside-down. Western leaders seem indifferent to their constituents’ will, international law is routinely and casually ignored, and war is used as the main tool of international policy. Suddenly, the democratic west is rushing headlong to intervene militarily around North Africa and the Middle East with barely any debate about these costly adventures.

The systemic causes of the growing militarism in the west

Following the day-to-day events, the rationale for war is always apparent to a casual observer. Colonel Gaddafi was a bad guy oppressing his own people, so we had to go and help the Libyans. Al Qaeda terrorists were about to take over in Mali and we had to go there and free the people. Now Bashar Al- Assad is killing his own people so we must go and help the Syrians. But while we can always come up with an immediate reason to wage war, what if there was a deeper, more systemic cause that inclines western nations toward armed conflict?

In meticulously tracing the events leading to last century’s two world wars, Carrol Quigley devotes much space in his book “Tragedy and Hope” to an economic phenomenon called the deflationary gap. Quigley considers the deflationary gap as “the key to twentieth century economic crisis and one of the three central cores of the whole tragedy of the twentieth century”.

To explain this phenomenon, and how it can give rise to militarism, we have to go back to economics for a moment. The subject of analysis is a closed economic system in which the sum total of goods and services appearing in the market equals the income of the system and the aggregate cost of producing the goods and services. The sums expended by the businesses on wages, rents, salaries, raw materials, interest, lawyers’ fees, and so on, represent income to those who receive them. The profits are entrepreneur’s income and his incentive to produce the wealth in question. The goods are offered for sale at a price which is equal to the sum of all costs and profits. On the whole, aggregate costs, aggregate incomes and aggregate prices are the same, since they represent the opposite sides of the same expenditures.

However, the purchasing power available in the system is reduced by the amount of savings. If there are any savings, the available purchasing power will be less than the aggregate asking prices by the amount of the savings, and all the goods and services produced cannot be sold as long as savings are held back. In order for all the goods to be sold, savings must reappear in the market as purchasing power. Normally, this is done through investment. But whenever investment is less than savings, purchasing power will fall short of the amount needed to buy the goods being offered. This shortfall of purchasing power in the system, the excess of savings over investment, is the deflationary gap.

Methods of bridging the deflationary gap

Deflationary gap can be closed either by lowering the supply of goods or by raising the supply of purchasing power, or by a combination of both methods.

The first solution will stabilize the economic system on a low level of economic activity. The second will stabilize it on a high level of economic activity. Left to itself, a modern economic system would adopt the former alternative, resulting in a deflationary spiral: the deflationary gap would lead to falling prices, declining economic activity, rising unemployment, and a fall of national income. In turn, this would cause a decline in the volume of savings, until savings reached the level of investment, at which point the economy becomes stabilized at a low level of activity.

This process was not allowed to unfold in any industrialized country during the great depression of 1929-1934 because the disparity in the distribution of income between the rich and the poor was so great that it would cause a considerable portion of the population to be driven to absolute poverty before the savings of the richer segment of the population could decline to the level of investment. Moreover, as the depression deepened, the level of investment declined even more rapidly than the level of savings. To avert social uprisings, governments of all industrial nations attempted to generate a recovery through two kinds of measures: (a) those which destroy goods and (b) those which produce goods which do not enter the market.

Averting depression through destruction of goods

The destruction of goods will close the deflationary gap by reducing the supply of unsold goods. While this is not generally recognized, this method is one of the chief ways in which the gap is closed in a normal business cycle. In such a cycle, goods are destroyed by the simple expedient of underutilizing the system’s production capacities. The failure to use the economic system at the 1929 level of output during the years 1930-1934 represented a loss of goods worth $100,000,000,000 in the United States, Britain, and Germany alone. This loss was equivalent to the destruction of such goods.

Destruction of goods by failure to gather the harvest because the selling price is too low is a common phenomenon under modern conditions, especially in respect to fruit and vegetable crops. While the outright destruction of goods already produced is not common, it has occurred in the depression years 1930-1934: stores of coffee, sugar, and bananas were destroyed, corn was plowed under, and young livestock was slaughtered to reduce the supply on the market. The destruction of goods in warfare is another example of this method of overcoming deflationary conditions in the economic system.

Producing goods that don’t enter the market The second method of bridging the deflationary gap, by producing goods which do not enter the market, supplies purchasing power in the market (the costs of production of such goods enter the market as purchasing power), while the goods themselves do not drain funds from the system, as they are not offered for sale. New investment would be the natural means to accomplish this, but modern economic systems in depression do not function this way. Rather, private investment tends to decline considerably. Alternatively, purchasing power must be supplied to the system through government spending. Unfortunately, any program of public spending quickly leads to the problem of public debt and inflation, which tends to compound the problems rather than solving them.

War: the irresistible solution

Approaches to public spending as a method of financing an economic recovery can vary depending on its objectives. Spending for destruction of goods or for restriction of output, as under the early New Deal agricultural program is hard to implement in a democratic country, because it obviously results in a decline in national income and living standards. Spending for nonproductive monuments or prestige projects like space programs is somewhat easier to justify but is not a long-term solution. The best approach, obviously is investing in productive capital goods, since it leads to an increase in national wealth and standards of living and constitutes a long-run solution.

Unfortunately, this approach runs into ideological head-winds in modern economies as it constitutes a permanent departure from the system of private capitalism. As such, it is easily attacked in a country with a capitalistic ideology and a private banking system. Instead, developed nations tend to favor the most dangerous method of bridging the deflationary gap: spending on armaments and national defense.

The appeal of this method is always rooted in political and ideological grounds. Military spending tends to help heavy industry directly and immediately. Heavy industry suffers earliest and most drastically in a depression, which absorbs manpower most readily (thus reducing unemployment). This tends to make it very influential in most countries. Defense-related spending is also easily justified to the public on grounds of national security. But increasing defense spending enhances the political clout of the military-industrial complex and tends to increase a nation’s reliance on the military in the conduct of its foreign policy and an escalation of conflict which leads to further increases in military spending. The vicious cycle ultimately results in the emergence of fascism: the adoption by the vested interests in a society of an authoritarian form of government in order to maintain their vested interests and prevent the reform of the society.

In the last century in Europe, the vested interests usually sought to prevent the reform of the economic system (a reform whose need was made evident by the long-drawn depression) by adopting an economic program whose chief element was the effort to fill the deflationary gap by rearmament.

Quigley’s analysis, based on the historical developments in the aftermath of the economic depression of the early 1930’s closely parallels today’s events. The economic crises which germinated from the same systemic feature present in the modern economic system followed a similar pattern in economic and political developments that we are witnessing today.

To avert a deflationary depression, US Government ramped up military spending

In the last 100 years, we have seen similar developments lead to two world wars, the second of which included the use of nuclear weapons. Today, as we seem to be sliding in the same direction, the question is whether we can extricate ourselves from this destructive path. If the day-to-day events are shaping the outcomes, then no one can tell. But if they are shaped by systemic attributes inherent to our socio-economic system, then we should expect further expansion and escalation of military conflicts around the world in the following years.

Escalation of military conflict and investor risks

Sadly, we have to consider this problem from investor point of view as well – and here, while the outcomes are unpredictable, the key risks to investors are rather clear, and they include:

  • sharp rises in commodity prices
  • high inflation
  • sustained rise in interest rates
  • deepening economic recession, and
  • increasing asset price volatility

A book that could change y(our) History – Unlocking the Code of History by David Murrin

A book that could change y(our) History – Unlocking the Code of History by David Murrin

Every now and then a book comes along that can change everything and lead you down (or up) a new path; a path that you would not have discovered without reading it. I wish I had read this book in my twenties or even my thirties. But as St. Augustine once said: “It is better to live with remorse than with regret!” – I am happy to have read it now and introduce it to my friends and family and keep it as far away as possible from my competitors. It gives the reader an amazing insight into how the world really works and why history seems to annoyingly repeat itself and how to benefit from the inevitable consequences that follow along this path.

I first met David Murrin about 10 years ago when he came to our lake in Italy as the keynote speaker to coach our team on geopolitical macro issues affecting our investment decisions. It was hands down one of the best presentations I ever attended. I then lost touch for a few years and was recently reconnected after reading his book.

This book: “Unlocking the Code of History” should be mandatory reading (and testing) for every single college entrant and should ideally become part of the school curriculum. (Yes, its THAT good).

Here’s a link to some of his TV appearances

I highly recommend downloading or ordering the book online. I believe anyone that reads it will gain a tremendous advantage.

More about David:

David has a 2:1 Honours degree in Geophysics from Exeter University. He started his career in the oil exploration business in the jungles of Papua New Guinea where he  worked for almost three years . Since then he has spent the past 25 years in the world of financial markets.  Read the rest of this entry »


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Jeremy Grantham – The Race of our Lives

Jeremy Grantham – The Race of our Lives

“Our global economy, reckless in its use of all resources and natural systems, shows many of the indicators of potential failure that brought down so many civilizations before ours. By sheer luck, though, ours has two features that might just save our bacon: declining fertility rates and progress in alternative energy. Our survival might well depend on doing everything we can to encourage their progress. Vested interests, though, defend the status quo effectively and the majority much prefers optimistic propaganda to uncomfortable truth and wishful thinking rather than tough action. It is likely to be a close race.
The collapse of civilizations is a gripping and resonant topic for many of us and one that has attracted many scholars over the years. They see many possible contributing factors to the collapse of previous civilizations, the evidence pieced together shard by shard from civilizations that often left few records. But some themes reoccur in the scholars’ work: geographic locations that had misfortune in the availability of useful animal and vegetable life, soil, water, and a source of energy; mismanagement in the overuse and depletion of resources, especially forests, soil, and water……

by Anric


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Ever wonder why we do this ?

This one graphic can answer it all in one go

This graphic reproduced courtesy of the World Economic Forum – Global Risks 2013 report is a concise way of illustrating some of the most severe and acute risks that face us today.

The Global Fund Exchange Group, established in 2005 is a specialist investor and strategic consultant focusing on vitally important impact assets in the world of food, water, energy and scarce resources. Founded and led by Anric Blatt and Lauralouise Duffy, the group manages liquid investment funds, custom fund mandates and provides strategic consulting for visionary investors that have become aware that earth’s greatest threats also serve as our most compelling investment opportunities.

by Anric

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